When Courts Label Democracy: Reflections on Canada’s Ruling Against APC and PDP.

On June 17, 2025, the Canadian Federal Court delivered a ruling that has triggered diplomatic concern and national introspection. In rejecting the asylum appeal of Nigerian citizen Douglas Egharevba, Justice Phuong Ngo described Nigeria’s two major political parties, the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), as organizations associated with conduct comparable to terrorism. The judge cited a pattern of electoral malpractice, systemic violence, and the coercion of democratic institutions.

Although the ruling arose from an individual immigration case, its broader implications for Nigeria’s political credibility and the legal standing of its public officials abroad cannot be ignored. It calls for a balanced and strategic response.

What Prompted the Ruling?

Egharevba, a former political operative in Nigeria, applied for asylum in Canada. In an attempt to strengthen his case, he admitted past membership in both APC and PDP, and described Nigeria’s political climate as violent and repressive. Rather than accept these claims as a basis for his protection, the court concluded that his affiliations made him complicit in the systemic subversion of democracy. The judgment relied on well documented reports of electoral violence, use of armed thugs, and manipulation of state security forces during elections.

What the Ruling Is, and What It Is Not.

It is important to clarify the legal weight and the limitations of the judgment.

What it is:

• A judicial finding in a specific asylum case, based on Canada’s immigration and national security statutes.

• A determination that parties accused of sustained violent or anti-democratic conduct may render their members inadmissible to Canada, even without direct personal involvement.

What it is not:

• It is not a formal designation of APC or PDP as terrorist organizations under Canada’s Criminal Code.

• It is not an official policy of the Canadian government, but a decision within the context of a single immigration matter.

• It does not automatically criminalize or ban all Nigerian political figures affiliated with these parties.

Nonetheless, the ruling has established a dangerous precedent. It introduces reputational risk for party members, especially those in the diaspora, and may influence future visa decisions, asylum hearings, or diplomatic engagements involving Nigerian politicians.

Legal Reasoning Versus Political Realities.

The court’s decision draws on a body of evidence that cannot be dismissed as fiction. Reports from the European Union Election Observation Missions (EU EOM), the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have consistently documented irregularities in Nigeria’s electoral processes.

The EU’s final report on the 2023 general elections, for example, highlighted instances of ballot box snatching, voter intimidation, and the partisan use of security agencies. The AU Election Observation Mission noted a lack of transparency in collation processes and the suppression of voters in certain regions. ECOWAS, while generally supportive of the elections’ credibility, also acknowledged serious concerns with logistics, violence, and disenfranchisement.

In other words, the Canadian court did not manufacture its conclusion; it interpreted publicly available facts in a legal context that prioritizes national security and democratic integrity.

Why This Interpretation Is Dangerous.

The concern is not just about the ruling, but about its implications when stretched to their logical limit. If APC and PDP are viewed as violent organizations, then virtually every Nigerian president since 1999, along with governors, ministers, senators, and local officials, could be said to have risen through institutions defined by coercion.

But then this raises questions about the consistency and fairness of international legal standards.

The Question of Double Standards.

Electoral violence and democratic imperfections are not unique to Nigeria. Throughout Latin America, South Asia, and even parts of Europe and North America, elections are sometimes marred by fraud, voter suppression, or police brutality. Yet, few Western courts have extended this to the level of disqualifying political party members from legal protection on terrorism grounds.

The most glaring double standard lies in the treatment of Israel’s Likud party, which has governed during intense military operations in Gaza and the West Bank. Numerous international bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Council and Amnesty International, have accused successive Likud-led governments of human rights violations. Yet, Canada and its allies have never treated Likud or its members as terrorist-linked or inadmissible.

This contrast shows how geopolitical alliances, not just legal criteria, shape how international behavior is judged. Non-Western democracies like Nigeria are often held to standards that their Western partners routinely circumvent.

Domestic Effort: Reforming from the Roots.

The Canadian court ruling should serve as a diplomatic wake-up call, and a mirror reflecting what Nigerians themselves have long known: the rot in Nigeria’s democracy begins with its political parties. APC, PDP, and indeed every registered party must move beyond rhetorical commitment to reform and confront the institutional failures they have normalized for decades.

a. Confronting Complicity in Electoral Abuse.

There is overwhelming video and eyewitness evidence of vote buying, ballot box snatching, and voter intimidation by all major parties in past general and off-cycle elections. During the most recent by-elections, these patterns continued, often with party agents and thugs acting openly, some even in police presence.

Yet, party leaders, including presidential candidates, often point fingers at the opposition while ignoring their own party’s criminal complicity. This culture of denial and impunity must end.

b. Codified Internal Party Ethics and Enforcement.

Political parties must:

• Adopt and enforce internal codes of conduct that clearly define unacceptable behavior, including election manipulation, thuggery, and vote trading.

• Set up credible disciplinary panels, independent of the candidate selection process, to investigate and sanction infractions swiftly.

• Publicly disclose any disciplinary actions taken, to build institutional trust.

c. Stricter Qualification Criteria for Party Leadership.

The quality of a party is determined by the quality of its leaders. The current model, which allows any financier, godfather, or ex-convict with influence to assume leadership, has damaged Nigeria’s democratic foundation.

Parties must adopt minimum moral and educational criteria for party executives at all levels. This may include, but not limited to:

• Evidence of tax compliance, no history of criminal conviction, and demonstrable public service record.

• Peer and community reference checks.

• Internal leadership screening panels independent of factional influence.

If party leadership is competent and principled, the product; candidates, political culture, manifestos, and campaign tone, will improve.

d. Severe Penalties for Electoral Misconduct.

INEC, working with party structures, civil society, and the judiciary, must pursue a zero tolerance approach:

• Any candidate or party caught engaging in vote buying, violence, or other proven misconduct should face disqualification, public exposure, and financial penalties.

• Political parties that fail to discipline their members internally should face temporary deregistration, campaign bans, or withdrawal of INEC funding.

• ⁠INEC staff complicit in any act of electoral misconduct must face a minimum of 2 years jail term.

Laws already exist to criminalize such conduct, but selective enforcement has made them ineffective. A new political offenses tribunal could be considered to fast track prosecution and enforce deterrent rulings.

e. Borrowing Global Best Practices.

Nigeria can learn from:

• Mexico’s Electoral Management System, where vote buying investigations trigger sanctions against both individuals and parties.

• India’s Election Commission, which restricts campaign financing, deploys cash tracking systems, and disqualifies politicians convicted of electoral offenses.

• South Africa’s party funding disclosure law, requiring all donations above a certain threshold to be published, reducing the role of illicit political financiers.

f. Grassroots Civic Reorientation.

Long term reform must also address the demand side of vote buying, the electorate. Voter education and political enlightenment must be built into party structures. Parties should create platforms for:

• Regular townhall engagements.

• Transparent primary election debates.

• Inclusion of youth, women, and professionals in meaningful roles, not just symbolic quotas.

International Effort: Restoring Credibility Abroad.

a. Diplomatic Engagement.

The Federal Government of Nigeria must move beyond official protest. It should:

• Initiate a formal diplomatic dialogue with the Canadian government to clarify the implications of the ruling.

• Engage Canada’s immigration appeal structures, either directly or through affected individuals.

• Coordinate with the Ministry of Justice, National Intelligence Agency, and diaspora organizations to track and challenge any misuse of the ruling in future cases.

b. Rebuilding Democratic Reputation.

Nigeria must also pursue soft power strategies to rebuild its international democratic reputation. This includes:

• Hosting international forums on democratic reform and political inclusion.

• Collaborating with election observer missions to implement past recommendations.

• Facilitating independent reviews of internal party processes by credible third parties.

Conclusion. 

The Canadian court’s decision may have overreached, but it was not unfounded. It reflects the cumulative effect of electoral violence, impunity, and partisan abuse that Nigeria has tolerated for too long.

The danger is not in what the court said, but in the fact that it could say it with such legal confidence, drawing from Nigeria’s own record.

The question now is whether Nigeria will treat this as a diplomatic insult or a national warning. To simply dismiss the ruling without reform would be to repeat the very behavior that led to it.

Because whether we agree with the decision or not, one truth remains: we helped write the narrative that others are now using to define us.

References

1. Canadian Federal Court Ruling : Douglas Egharevba v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) – Federal Court of Canada, June 17, 2025.

2. Femi Falana (SAN) – Commentary on the Ruling.

• Falana, Femi. “Beyond Judicial Recognition of APC and PDP as Terrorist Groups.” Vanguard Nigeria, August 2025 : https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/08/beyond-judicial-recognition-of-apc-and-pdp-as-terrorist-groups-by-femi-falana

3. Federal Government of Nigeria Reaction.

- Punch Newspaper. “FG Blasts Canada Over ‘Reckless’ Terrorist Tag on PDP, APC.” August 2025 : https://punchng.com/fg-blasts-canada-over-reckless-terrorist-tag-on-pdp-apc 

4. European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM).

• Final Report: Nigeria General Elections 2023. EU Election Observation Mission : https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eom-nigeria-2023

5. African Union Election Observation Mission (AU EOM).

• Preliminary and Final Reports on Nigeria’s 2023 General Elections. AU Peace and Security Department : https://au.int/en/election-observation-missions/nigeria

6. ECOWAS Election Observation Mission.

• Statement on the 2023 General Elections in Nigeria. ECOWAS Commission : https://www.ecowas.int/election-observation

7. Amnesty International Reports.

• Amnesty International. “Nigeria: A Harsh Climate for Dissent.” 2023 : https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/020/2023/en

• Amnesty International. “Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Evidence of War Crimes.” 2023 : https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2023/10/israel-opt-war-crimes

8. United Nations Human Rights Council Reports.

• OHCHR. Reports on Israeli Military Operations and Human Rights Violations : https://www.ohchr.org/en

9. Canadian Criminal Code – Terrorist Designation Criteria.

• Government of Canada. Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46), Section 83.05 : https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-83.05.html

10. Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

• Government of Canada. IRPA – Section 34: Security Grounds for Inadmissibility : https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-2.5/section-34.html

11. Global Electoral Governance Practices.

• International IDEA. “Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A Handbook.” : https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/funding-political-parties-and-election-campaigns-handbook

• Election Commission of India. Handbook for Candidates and Electoral Offences : https://eci.gov.in