Now That We Have To Learn To Defend Ourselves.

In Russia today, eight year olds are being taught to fire rifles, crawl under barbed wire, and throw hand grenades in boot camps cloaked as patriotism. It may be shocking, but it is real. And to a society that value the lives of their citizens, it is even considered a right.

Meanwhile, here in Nigeria, our Chief of Defence Staff tells us to learn taekwondo, judo, and how to swim, as though deadly insurgents respect a black belt, or as though our villages can be fortified with martial arts instead of real security. One normalizes violence, the other abandons us to it.

For years, the Nigerian state has poured billions of naira into “security votes” and federal budgets. Yet insecurity has only metastasized: kidnapping for ransom is now mainstream commerce, terror factions roam forests and highways freely, unchecked, unchallenged and even unbothered, and children are dying, not in war zones, but in rural Nigeria, from hunger and malnutrition.

In Katsina alone, Médecins Sans Frontières reports at least 652 children have already died from malnutrition in the first half of 2025, a staggering 208% rise compared to the same period last year. UNICEF warns that 35.1 million Nigerian children under five are malnourished, with 100 children dying every hour from hunger related causes. The FAO confirms that Nigeria bears the highest global number of food-insecure people, 31.8 million, and a doubling in malnutrition cases in regions like Borno.

This is no accident of fate. Poverty, conflict, and disrupted livelihoods form a deadly triangle. Empirical studies show that insecurity directly undermines food security, displaces farming communities, destroys entitlements, and cripples agriculture. In Benue State, a mere 1% rise in insecurity reduced crop output by 0.21% and livestock output by 0.31%. These are not abstract figures. They are mothers burying children who starved in the shadow of government failure. Those who swore with Bibles in one hand and constitutions in the other have failed us. Enough.

Organized Self Defence: State, Local and Ward Security Committees.

We will not discount the advice of the Chief Warrior of Nigeria, our Chief of Defence Staff. If he says we should learn to defend ourselves, then we must take him seriously. Sadly, the rising death toll already shows that to rely on the military and police alone for protection is a continuation of terror and losses of our fellow citizens. They have not been able to keep up with the terrorists, and now they have told us to protect ourselves. Very well then, let us organize ourselves properly.

If Nigerians must now defend themselves, then defence must be organized, legitimate, and funded. Every State must establish a State Security Office, Local Government Areas (LGA) should immediately establish a Security Committee, replicated in every ward at a smaller scale:

Office of the State Security Adviser (OSSA)

Every state must establish an Office of the State Security Adviser, properly funded and empowered. The OSSA will serve as the nerve center that ties together the scattered arms of security and humanitarian response. Without such an office, local government committees and ward structures will be left floating without direction.

Core Responsibilities of the OSSA:

1. Coordination Across Agencies – ensure smooth communication and cooperation between the military, police, DSS, Civil Defence, vigilantes, and humanitarian actors.

2. Oversight of Local Committees – supervise the LGA and ward security committees, standardize their operations, and evaluate their performance against set KPIs.

3. Budget and Resource Allocation – oversee the proper use of the state’s 50 percent security vote for community defence and humanitarian integration.

4. Early Warning & Intelligence Hub – run a central state command center where alerts from LGAs and wards are received, analyzed, and escalated to zonal and federal commands.

5. Training and Capacity Development – coordinate youth self defence and survival training programs across wards, ensuring quality and oversight.

6. Community Engagement – liaise with traditional rulers, faith leaders, and civil society to build trust, manage rumors, and de-escalate tensions before they explode.

7. Accountability & Reporting – publish quarterly reports to the public on threats, incidents, funds spent, and actions taken, ensuring transparency.

The OSSA must not be another ceremonial office for political cronies. It must be professional, transparent, and subject to public scrutiny. It is the bridge between the state government’s resources and the survival of its citizens.

Composition at LGA Level

• Local Government Chairman (political oversight, budgetary authority).

• Traditional Chiefs (cultural legitimacy, mobilization).

• Military Attaché (liaison to armed forces, intelligence sharing).

• Vigilante Leadership (grassroots knowledge, rapid response). 

• Religious Leaders (counter-extremist narratives, mediation).

• Business Community Leader (resource mobilization, economic perspective).

• Media Attaché (communication, rumor control, public awareness).

Ward-Level Committees

• Ward or Village Head.

• Youth and women leaders.

• Vigilante representative.

• Religious or educational figure.

• Security liaison (where available).

• Media liaison (critical).

Core Responsibilities (TORs).

These committees cannot be another layer of bureaucracy. Their mandate must be sharp and measurable:

1. Security Watch & Verification – ground truth the actual deployment of soldiers, police, and vigilantes. No more empty claims of presence.

2. Operational Coordination – identify choke points in inter-agency communication and fix response failures.

3. Community Resilience Mapping – track coping mechanisms, including the role of vigilantes, traditional rulers, and peace initiatives.

4. Institutional Weakness Auditing – flag procurement failures, command bottlenecks, and gaps in accountability. 

5. Self-Defence Training – organize martial arts, tactical awareness, survival drills, and where sanctioned, basic weapons handling for vetted youths.

6. Early Warning Systems – build local alert lines, hotlines, WhatsApp groups, and radio alerts tied to zonal operation rooms. 

7. De-escalation & Mediation – prevent retaliatory violence and calm religious or ethnic flare-ups.

8. Public Information Management – partner with local media to suppress rumors and spread facts.

Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).

To prove their worth, these committees must be judged by results:

• Incidents Reported Within 24 Hours: Every attack, suspicious movement, or attempted raid must be reported within a day. Silence is complicity, and delay is death. A functioning committee should achieve at least 80% reporting compliance.

• Reduction in Kidnappings and Attacks: The measure of success is whether lives are saved. Committees must track and publish attack statistics monthly and quarterly, showing real downward trends.

• Response Time to Alerts: Speed is life. Terrorists must not be able to spend hours in a village unchallenged. Committees must push average response times from days to hours, and hours to minutes.

• Youth Training Coverage: Vulnerability ends where preparedness begins. Each ward should record and publish the number of young people trained in survival and self defence every quarter, with targets set in percentages.

• Peace and De-escalation Dialogues: Violence often begins with rumors and provocations. Committees must track the number of peace forums, mediation efforts, and community dialogues, with success measured by the prevention of flare-ups.

• Inter-agency Security Briefings: The curse of Nigerian security is disunity. Committees must organize monthly security briefings where information is shared and acted upon.

• Additional Social Indicators: Track the reopening of schools, the return of displaced families, and the revival of local markets. These are the human signs of restored security.

Illustrative Interventions.

These committees must do more than meet. They must deliver visible change:

• Emergency Child Nutrition Programs – to cut hunger and starvation in hot spots and reduce the risk of youth recruitment.

• Community-Based Security Support Units – integrate vetted vigilantes and hunters under clear oversight.

• Early-Warning Systems – toll-free hotlines, apps, and community radio for rapid alerts.

• Public Works for Peace – employ youths in rebuilding feeder roads, farms, and schools.

• Conflict-to-Production Zones – pilot LGAs where improved security is tied to agriculture and power supply, showing that peace means livelihood.

A Detailed Summary of Benefits.

One of the first and most direct benefits of this programme is employment and livelihoods. Training programs in self defence, surveillance, and community policing will give young people structured roles and responsibilities, keeping them away from idleness and the temptations of recruitment into armed groups. Public works such as feeder road repairs, school rebuilding, farm recovery, and other small infrastructure projects will directly employ thousands of youths and women in each Local Government Area. Formalizing security support units such as vetted vigilantes, hunters, and local guards, and providing them stipends, will create semi formal jobs in rural communities. In addition, roles for martial arts instructors, survival trainers, nutrition officers, and data clerks for early warning networks will open new employment paths for people who can contribute to keeping their communities safe.

Food security and agriculture will also be revitalized once security improves. Farmers who have abandoned their lands due to attacks will be able to return and restore production. Conflict to Production Zones, which link security improvements with agricultural revival, will increase food supply, reduce hunger, and help stabilize food prices in local markets. With better protection of rural storage facilities and transport corridors, post harvest losses will reduce drastically, ensuring that food produced actually reaches the markets. Livestock recovery will also be possible, as cattle rustling and raids diminish, allowing pastoral families to rebuild their herds and earn a stable income.

Local industries and technology will be stimulated as communities begin to secure themselves. Adoption of simple, low cost rural telecoms and analog radio for early warning systems will open new opportunities for small telecom ventures, equipment suppliers, and maintenance workers. Community radio stations will grow as part of these warning systems, creating employment for broadcasters, technicians, and journalists. The demand for uniforms, security kits, solar lanterns, radios, and even low-cost drones will stimulate light manufacturing and assembly industries. Renewable energy and micro grids tied to Conflict to Production Zones will also create demand for solar installers, mini grid operators, and technicians, ensuring that power access is tied directly to peace and productivity.

Governance and accountability will also be strengthened. The Office of the State Security Adviser (OSSA) in each state will become a hub of employment for analysts, coordinators, ICT staff, trainers, and auditors. Communities monitoring security votes and budgets will promote transparency, reduce corruption, and rebuild trust between citizens and the state. Forcing coordination between the military, police, civil defence, and local structures will improve efficiency and reduce duplication of efforts, ensuring that limited resources are used effectively.

Finally, this programme will deliver wide social and human development benefits. Safer schools will mean improved access to education, with higher enrollment and reduced dropout rates, especially for children in rural and conflict prone areas. Emergency nutrition programs will provide life saving support and create roles for local health workers, ensuring that thousands of children are not lost to preventable hunger. Peace dialogues and mediation will reduce cycles of revenge killings, giving communities the space to heal and invest in progress rather than war. Visible structures of local defence will also restore pride and confidence, ending the sense of abandonment and giving communities dignity as they take part in their own protection.

Funding Must Match Rhetoric.

To tell Nigerians to defend themselves without funding is cruelty. If self defence is a right, then it must be paid for with the people’s money:

• Military Budget – Dedicate at least 10% to community defence structures.

• State Security Votes – Commit no less than 50% to LGA and ward security systems.

• Disaster & Humanitarian Agencies – Redirect at least 50% of their budgets to protecting conflict communities.

• State Security Officers – Every state must appoint an officer to coordinate security efforts across agencies.

• Audit & Publish – All allocations must be published quarterly for the public to see.

• Co-Funding by Business & Faith Groups – Local resources must also be mobilized for equipment and training.

Strategy Must Be Informed by Experience.

When a government tells its citizens to defend themselves, then self defence is no longer a hobby, it becomes a right. And if it is a right, it must be funded, structured, audited, and institutionalized. It cannot be left to chance, to charity, or to empty talk.

No more judo jokes while our children starve. No more lip service while villages are left unguarded. We will not die quietly while the state tells us to learn karate. If the government admits it cannot safeguard us, then it must at least fund us to do so.

Self defence is our right under the constitution that gives the government its powers. And every right must be backed with structure, law, and funding.

No more platitudes. No more excuses. Let us build the systems that protect our children. We must either build these systems now, or we will watch the next generation burn, burying them as victims of hunger and violence.

Peace is not a slogan. Peace is structure, peace is food, peace is security, and peace is life.

Call to Action.

It is no longer enough to complain, or to bury our dead in silence. Since we have reached that bridge of self defence as advised by government, then civil society must rise to amplify these demands, faith leaders must speak with one voice, and the press must shine its light on the betrayal of security promises. Communities must organize, governors must account for their votes, and legislators must insist on laws that turn self defence into structured community protection.

If the state cannot pull its weight on security matters, then it is the people who must demand the building of a new shield, one that protects the weak and restores dignity to the living.

#yb

References

• Reuters (2025). At least 652 children die of malnutrition in Katsina in six months.

• UNICEF (2024). Child Malnutrition in Nigeria.

• FAO (2024). Global Report on Food Security.

• NISER Policy Brief (2025). Insecurity and Food Security in Nigeria.

• Arxiv Research (2025). Impact of Insecurity on Agriculture in Benue State.

• Carnegie Endowment (2019). Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram.